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Abstract. This paper deals with cooperative games in which only certain coalitions are allowed
to form. There have been previous models developed to confront the problem of nonfeasible coalitions.
Games restricted by a communication graph are games in which the feasible coalitions are those that
induce connected subgraphs. Another type of model is determined by the positions of the players
in a so-called permission structure. In this paper, the restrictions to the cooperation are given
by a combinatorial structure called an augmenting system which generalizes antimatroid structure
and the system of connected subgraphs of a graph. Furthermore, the class of augmenting systems
includes the conjunctive and disjunctive systems derived from a permission structure. The value α
is a generalization of the Myerson value for games restricted by graphs and the Shapley value for
games restricted by permission structures. The main results of the paper are the characterization
of the value α for augmenting structures by using component efficiency, loop-null, and balanced
contributions, and another characterization by consistency of this value. Furthermore, we implement
a direct algorithm to compute this value by using the outputs of the original game.
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1. Introduction. Cooperative games under combinatorial restrictions are a type
of cooperative game in which the players have restricted communication possibili-
ties which are defined by a combinatorial structure. The first model in which the
restrictions are defined by the connected subgraphs of a graph was introduced by
Myerson [10]. Since then, many other situations where players have communication
restrictions have been studied in cooperative game theory. Contributions on graph-
restricted games include Owen [12], Borm, Owen, and Tijs [3], and Hamiache [7]. In
these models the possibilities of coalition formation are determined by the positions
of the players in a communication graph. Another type of combinatorial structure in-
troduced by Gilles, Owen, and van den Brink [6] and van den Brink [15] is equivalent
to a subclass of antimatroids. This line of research focuses on the possibilities of coali-
tion formation determined by the positions of the players in the so-called permission
structure.
Consider a setting with four players that are almost completely connected, the
only pair of players not connected directly being players 1 and 4. A license is required
to sell products, which is the way profit can be obtained in this example. Licenses
are assumed to be transferable in a coalition. Initially, each one of players 1 and 4
has a license. A coalition is now called feasible if it is internally connected and has
at least one license. Note that the union of two feasible coalitions with a nonempty
intersection is feasible again. Moreover, for any nonempty feasible coalition T and any
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of its feasible subcoalitions S, one can find a player that is in T but not in the coalition
S such that the player can join to coalition S and the result will be a feasible coalition
again. Finally, the empty set is assumed to be feasible. In fact, these three conditions
make up a combinatorial structure called an augmenting system, introduced by Bilbao
[2]. The example sketched results in an augmenting system that cannot be obtained
from a communication graph and which is not an antimatroid either; consequently, it
does not correspond to any of the two set systems derived from permission structures.
An argument similar to the one given in the former example can be derived in a
four-retailer system with two warehouses. Consider four retailers which are almost
completely connected except for retailers 1 and 4, who are not connected directly. A
warehouse is necessary to replenish the inventory. Retailers 1 and 4 are the only ones
with a warehouse. A coalition is now called feasible if it is internally connected and has
at least one warehouse. Therefore, as before, this example gives way to an augmenting
system which cannot be modeled by a communication graph or an antimatroid.1 We
stress here that the set of augmenting systems contains, on one hand, the set of
antimatroid systems, in particular the sets of conjunctive and disjunctive systems
derived from a permission structure, and, on the other hand, the set of systems
(connected coalitions) that can be derived from a graph. So, two important lines of
research in the literature are unified.
The focus of this paper is on an allocation rule for games under augmenting
systems. This rule coincides with the Myerson value for communication situations
(games with a graph) and with the Shapley value for games on antimatroids. We
concentrate on two characterizations. The first one uses a balanced contribution type
of property, in line with the results of Myerson [11] and Slikker [14]. Our extended
setting calls for the use of tools from discrete mathematics, such as the Möbius in-
version formula. The second characterization uses a consistency property inspired
by the results of Hart and Mas-Colell [8] for the unconstrained setting. This consis-
tency property requires the same payoffs for players in the original setting and in a
natural reduced setting (with respect to the allocation rule) with fewer players. A
natural formulation of this reduced framework is in terms of restriction systems and
the trace on subsets. Technical complexities following these definitions to obtain a
characterization are tackled.
The setup of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we recall preliminaries on
augmenting systems and related combinatorial structures, followed in section 3 by
the analysis of new structural properties of augmenting systems. Sections 4 and 5
concentrate on characterizations of a value for games under augmenting systems using
a balanced contributions property and a consistency property, respectively. Section 6
presents an algorithm to compute this value by using the outputs of the nonrestricted
game. These results generalize, unify, and simplify the results of Myerson [10], Owen
[12], Gilles, Owen, and van den Brink [6], and van den Brink [15].
2. Augmenting systems. This section is based on Bilbao [2]. It basically
recalls preliminaries on augmenting systems and some concepts and results that will
be used in the following. Antimatroids were introduced by Dilworth [4] as particular
examples of semimodular lattices. Since then, several authors have obtained the
same concept by abstracting various combinatorial situations (see Korte, Lovász, and
Schrader [9]). Let N be a finite set. A set system over N is a pair (N,F) where
F ⊆ 2N is a family of subsets. The sets belonging to F are called feasible. We will
write S ∪ i and S \ i instead of S ∪ {i} and S \ {i}, respectively.








































































































Copyright © by SIAM. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.
994 E. ALGABA, J. M. BILBAO, AND M. SLIKKER
Definition 2.1. A set system (N,A) is an antimatroid if
(A1) ∅ ∈ A;
(A2) for S, T ∈ A we have S ∪ T ∈ A;
(A3) for S ∈ A with S = ∅, there exists i ∈ S such that S \ i ∈ A.
Let (N,A) be an antimatroid and let S, T ∈ A such that |S| < |T | . Property
A3 implies an ordering T = {i1, . . . , it} with {i1, . . . , ij} ∈ A for j = 1, . . . , t. Let
k ∈ {1, . . . , t} be the minimum index with ik /∈ S. Then S ∪ ik = S ∪ {i1, . . . , ik} ∈
A by property A2. Therefore, the definition of antimatroid implies the following
augmentation property: If S, T ∈ A with |S| < |T |, then there exists i ∈ T \ S such
that S ∪ i ∈ A.
Convex geometries are a combinatorial abstraction of convex sets introduced by
Edelman and Jamison [5].
Definition 2.2. A set system (N,G) is a convex geometry if it satisfies the
following properties:
(G1) ∅ ∈ G;
(G2) for S, T ∈ G we have S ∩ T ∈ G;
(G3) for S ∈ G with S = N , there exists i ∈ N \ S such that S ∪ i ∈ G.
Next, we will recall the formal concept of an augmenting system.
Definition 2.3. An augmenting system is a set system (N,F) with the following
properties:
(P1) ∅ ∈ F ;
(P2) for S, T ∈ F with S ∩ T = ∅, we have S ∪ T ∈ F ;
(P3) for S, T ∈ F with S ⊂ T, there exists i ∈ T \ S such that S ∪ i ∈ F .
Now, it is given the relationship between the combinatorial structures mentioned
above.
Proposition 2.4. (i) An augmenting system (N,F) is an antimatroid if and
only if F is closed under union.
(ii) An augmenting system (N,F) is a convex geometry if and only if F is closed
under intersection and N ∈ F .
Example. The following collections of subsets ofN = {1, . . . , n}, given by F = 2N ,
F = {∅, {i}}, where i ∈ N, and F = {∅, {1}, . . . , {n}} , are augmenting systems over
N .
Example. In a communication graph G = (N,E), the set system (N,F) given by
F = {S ⊆ N : (S,E(S)) is a connected subgraph of G} is an augmenting system.
Example. Gilles, Owen, and van den Brink [6] showed that the feasible coali-
tion system (N,F) derived from the conjunctive or disjunctive approach contains the
empty set and the ground set N and that it is closed under union. Algaba et al. [1]
showed that the coalition systems derived from the conjunctive and disjunctive ap-
proach were identified to poset antimatroids and antimatroids with the path property,
respectively. Thus, these coalition systems are augmenting systems.
Remark. Notice that augmenting systems include antimatroids and the systems
of connected subgraphs of a given graph. However, the system of connected sub-
graphs of a communication graph is not closed under union. So, in order to unify
these structures in the augmenting systems it is vital to require property (P2) to
hold, which establishes that common players in two feasible coalitions will perform a
very important role to turn the union of two feasible coalitions into a bigger feasible
coalition.
Definition 2.5. Let (N,F) be an augmenting system. For a feasible coalition
S ∈ F , we define the set S∗ = {i ∈ N \ S : S ∪ i ∈ F} of augmentations of S and the
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C ∈ F : S ⊆ C ⊆ S+}
is equal to
{
C ∈ 2N : S ⊆ C ⊆ S+} for every nonempty S ∈ F .
Let (N,F) be a set system and let S ⊆ N be a subset. The maximal nonempty
feasible subsets of S are called components of S. Observe that if (N,A) is an antima-
troid, then any subset S ⊆ N has a unique component given by the following operator
int (S) =
⋃ {C ∈ A : C ⊆ S}. We denote by CF (S) the set of the components of a
subset S ⊆ N . Observe that the set CF (S) may be the empty set. This set will play
a role in the concept of a game restricted by an augmenting system.
Proposition 2.7. A set system (N,F) satisfies property P2 if and only if, for
any S ⊆ N with CF (S) = ∅, the components of S form a partition of a subset of S.
3. The supports of an augmenting system. Let (N,F) be an augmenting
system and let G ⊆ F . We define inductively the families
G(0) = G, G(n) =
{
S ∪ T : S, T ∈ G(n−1), S ∩ T = ∅
}
(n = 1, 2, . . .) .
Notice that G(0) ⊆ G(n−1) ⊆ G(n) ⊆ F , since G ⊆ F and F satisfies property P2.
The inductive process is finite because F is finite.
Definition 3.1. Let (N,F) be an augmenting system and let G ⊆ F . We define
the closure G by G = G(k), where k is the smallest integer such that G(k+1) = G(k).
Example. Let us consider N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and the family given by
F = {∅, {1} , {4} , {1, 2} , {1, 3} , {2, 4} , {3, 4} ,
{1, 2, 3} , {1, 2, 4} , {1, 3, 4} , {2, 3, 4} , N} .
For the family G = {∅, {1} , {4} , {1, 2} , {1, 3} , {2, 4} , {3, 4}}, note that
G(1) = G ∪ {{1, 2, 3} , {1, 2, 4} , {1, 3, 4} , {2, 3, 4}} ,
G(2) = G(1) ∪ {N} and G(2) = G = F .
Let (N,F) be an augmenting system. Then there can be feasible coalitions which
can be written as the union of two feasible coalitions with a nonempty intersection.
So, we can consider the following set:
R (F) = {R ∈ F : R = S ∪ T, S = R, T = R, S, T ∈ F , S ∩ T = ∅}.
Note that R (F) is composed of those feasible coalitions which can be written as
the union of two distinct feasible coalitions with a nonempty intersection.
Definition 3.2. Let (N,F) be an augmenting system. The elements of the set
B (F) = F \R (F) are called supports of (N,F).
By construction, the set B (F) is unique, nonempty if F is nonempty, and it
satisfies the following properties.
1. If ∅ ∈ F , then ∅ ∈ B (F).
2. If {i} ∈ F for some i ∈ N , then {i} ∈ B (F).
3. If S ∈ F is a minimal element in (F ,⊆), then S ∈ B (F).
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
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Fig. 1. The augmenting system (N,F).
Next, we obtain the following characterization of the set of supports.
Proposition 3.3. Let (N,F) be an augmenting system and B (F) the set of its
supports. Then B (F) is the minimal subset of F such that B (F) = F .
Proof. We first prove that B (F) = F . We have that B (F) ⊆ F , since B (F) ⊆ F
and F satisfies property P2. In order to prove the reverse inclusion, we use induction
on the number of elements of feasible coalitions in F . Clearly, the minimal elements in
(F ,⊆) belong to the system of supports and hence to B (F). Now, suppose F ∈ B (F)
for all F ∈ F with |F | < p. Then, given F ∈ F with |F | = p, we have either F ∈ B (F)
or F /∈ B (F). In the first case F ∈ B (F). Otherwise, F ∈ D (F), and hence there are
two feasible coalitions S, T ∈ F , S = F , T = F , S ∩ T = ∅ such that S ∪ T = F . By
using the induction hypothesis, since |S| < p and |T | < p, we have that S, T ∈ B (F),
and property P2 implies that F = S ∪ T ∈ B (F). Finally, we note that B (F) is a
minimal subset of F such that B (F) = F by construction.
Example. The set system given by N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and
F = {∅, {1} , {4} , {1, 2} , {1, 3} , {2, 4} , {3, 4} ,
{1, 2, 3} , {1, 2, 4} , {1, 3, 4} , {2, 3, 4} , N}
is the augmenting system given in Figure 1. Since {1, 4} /∈ F the system (N,F) is
not an antimatroid. Moreover, {1, 2} ∩ {2, 4} = {2} /∈ F , and hence (N,F) is not a
convex geometry.
Notice that the feasible coalition structure shown in Figure 1 corresponds to the
two examples mentioned in the introduction. The family of supports of (N,F) is
B (F) = {∅, {1} , {4} , {1, 2} , {1, 3} , {2, 4} , {3, 4}} .
Let us consider an augmenting system (N,F). An element i of a feasible set
S ∈ F is an extreme point of S if S \ i ∈ F . The set of extreme points of S is denoted
by ex(S). Note that property P3 implies A3 and hence |ex (S)| ≥ 1 for any nonempty
S ∈ F .
Lemma 3.4. Let (N,F) be an augmenting system such that {i} ∈ F for all i ∈ N.
Then
(1) every S ∈ F with |S| ≥ 2 satisfies |ex (S)| ≥ 2;
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Proof. (1) Suppose on the contrary that there exists S ∈ F with |S| ≥ 2 such
that |ex (S)| = 1. Then for some i ∈ S we have S \ i ∈ F and S \ j /∈ F for all j ∈ S
such that j = i. By hypothesis the set {i} ∈ F , and using property P3 we obtain the
chain
{i} = S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Ss−1 ⊂ Ss = S,
where Sk ∈ F and |Sk| = k for 1 ≤ k ≤ s. Since i ∈ Ss−1 we have Ss−1 = S \ j for
some j ∈ S, j = i, in contradiction with the assumption.
(2) Suppose that B ∈ B (F) is a support of F such that |B| > 2. Then by (1)
there exist i, j ∈ B, with i = j, B \ i ∈ F , and B \ j ∈ F . Thus
(B \ i) ∪ (B \ j) = B and (B \ i) ∩ (B \ j) = B \ {i, j} = ∅,
which contradicts the fact that B is a support of F .
Theorem 3.5. An augmenting system (N,F) is the system of connected sub-
graphs of the graph G = (N,E), where E = {S ∈ F : |S| = 2} if and only if {i} ∈ F
for all i ∈ N.
Proof. For every i ∈ N , the subgraph of G induced by {i} is connected and hence
{i} ∈ F . Conversely, let (N,F) be an augmenting system such that every singleton
{i} ∈ F . Let us consider the system (N,G) of connected subgraphs of the graph G.
If S ∈ G, then the subgraph (S,E (S)) is connected, and hence either S = {i} or S is
a union of edges with nonempty intersection. Since E ⊆ F , property P2 gives S ∈ F .
To obtain the reverse inclusion, let S ∈ F . If |S| ≤ 2, then S ∈ G. Suppose now
that |S| > 2. By Lemma 3.4(2) the nonempty supports of F are edges or vertices of
the graph G. Then S is a union of edges of G with nonempty intersection and thus
S ∈ G.
4. A value for augmenting structures. In this section we will characterize
an allocation rule for augmenting structures. First, we recall restricted games under
augmenting systems introduced in Bilbao [2].
Definition 4.1. Let v : 2N → R be a cooperative game and let (N,F) be an




v(T ) for all S ⊆ N.
Notice that for any S ⊆ N such that CF (S) = ∅, we have vF (S) = 0. If (N,F)





is a graph-restricted game which is studied by Myerson [10]
and Owen [12]. Let (N,A) be an antimatroid. Since A is closed under union, the









If we denote the unique element of CA (S) by cA (S), then the restricted game vA :
2N → R is defined by vA (S) = v (cA (S)) .
Let P be the set of all positive integers and letN = {1, . . . , n} ⊂ P. An augmenting
structure is a triple (N, v,F), where (N, v) is a cooperative game v : 2N → R with
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The Shapley value of a game (N, v) is the vector Φ (N, v) ∈ Rn given by
Φi (N, v) =
∑
{S⊆N :i∈S}
(s− 1)! (n− s)!
n!
(v (S)− v (S \ i)) ,
where i ∈ N, n = |N |, and s = |S| . We consider the following allocation rule for
games restricted by augmenting systems.
Definition 4.2. The value α for the set of augmenting structures AS is the
function α : AS → ⋃n≥1 Rn, defined by α (N, v,F) = Φ (N, vF), where Φ (N, vF) ∈
R
n is the Shapley value of the restricted game.
If (N,F) is an augmenting system such that {i} ∈ F for all i ∈ N , then the value
α (N, v,F) coincides with the Myerson value for games restricted by graphs.
We now describe the outcome of a cooperative game (N, v) restricted by an aug-
menting system (N,F). First, we consider component efficiency, a property that
would be desirable for an allocation rule on the set of augmenting systems AS, and
then we focus on the study of the value α for AS.
Definition 4.3. An allocation rule γ : AS → ⋃n≥1 Rn satisfies component
efficiency if ∑
i∈M
γi (N, v,F) = v(M)
for all (N, v,F) ∈ AS and M ∈ CF (N) .
The components of N form a partition of a subset of N , and we will show that
the allocation rule α on AS satisfies component efficiency.
Proposition 4.4. The value α : AS → ⋃n≥1 Rn satisfies component efficiency
on AS.
Proof. Let (N, v,F) ∈ AS. If N ∈ F , then CF (N) = {N}, and hence∑
i∈N







= vF(N) = v(N).
Suppose that N /∈ F . To each component C ∈ CF (N) we consider the game
wC : 2N → R, which is defined by





CF (T ) =
⋃
{CF(T ∩ C) : C ∈ CF(N)}
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Taking this into account and using the linearity of the Shapley value, for every com-
































C) = 0 for all C = M and i ∈ M , the above expression implies that∑
i∈M







= vF (M) = v(M).




S ∈ 2N : S ∈ F} =⋃ {M ∈ F : M ∈ CF (N)} .
Remark. In an augmenting system derived from the system of connected sub-
graphs of a communication graph, every player is feasible and therefore there are no
loop players. We will use the deletion of a player in an augmenting system; then this
player is a loop player in the augmenting system considered. It will be applied in the
induction proof of Theorem 4.7.
Definition 4.5. An allocation rule γ : AS → ⋃n≥1 Rn is loop-null if, for all
(N, v,F) ∈ AS and for any loop player i in (N,F) , we have γi (N, v,F) = 0.
Proposition 4.6. The value α : AS → ⋃n≥1 Rn is loop-null on AS.
Proof. Given (N, v,F) ∈ AS and a loop player i ∈ N, we haveCF (S) = CF (S \ i)






For the study of the balanced contributions axiom, we will analyze the effect of
deletion of a player, inspired by the contributions of Myerson [11] and Slikker [14].
Given a set system (N,F) and i ∈ N, we define F \ i = {S ∈ F : i /∈ S} . The set
system (N \ i,F \ i) is the deletion of i in (N,F) .
Proposition 4.7. If (N,F) is an augmenting system and i ∈ N, then (N \ i,F \ i)
is an augmenting system.
Proof. The set system (N \ i,F \ i) satisfies that ∅ ∈ F \ i. If S, T ∈ F \ i with
S ∩ T = ∅, then S ∪ T ∈ F and i /∈ S ∪ T ; hence S ∪ T ∈ F \ i. Finally, if S, T ∈ F \ i
with S ⊂ T, there exists j ∈ T \ S such that S ∪ j ∈ F . Since T ∈ F \ i implies j = i
and i /∈ S, we conclude that S ∪ j ∈ F \ i.
Notice that if (N,F) is an augmenting system and i ∈ N, then (N,F \ i) is also
an augmenting system in which i is a loop player.
Let γ be an allocation rule on AS and let (N, v,F) ∈ AS. For all i, j ∈ N with
i = j, the contribution of player i to the payoff of player j is given by
Dγij (N, v,F) = γj (N, v,F)− γj (N, v,F \ i) .
Definition 4.8. An allocation rule γ on AS has balanced contributions if, for
every (N, v,F) ∈ AS and any two players i, j ∈ N with i = j, we have
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We prove that the value α on AS has balanced contributions. First we introduce
the following concepts. For every nonempty R ⊆ N, we define the unanimity game
uR(T ) =
{
1 if R ⊆ T,
0 otherwise.








We shall call dR (v) the unanimity coefficient of R in the game v. Owen [12]
showed the following property: The unanimity games uR, where R is connected in
the graph G, form a basis of the graph-restricted games. Let (N,F) be the system
of connected subgraphs of a graph G = (N,E). Hamiache [7] proved a formula
for computing the unanimity coefficients in the game vF by using the outputs in
the original game v. Applying the Möbius inversion formula, Bilbao [2] extended
Hamiache’s formula and Owen’s property to the case in which (N,F) is an augmenting
system.
























= 0 for all R /∈ F .
Lemma 4.10. If (N, v,F) is an augmenting structure and i ∈ N, then the una-








for all R ∈ F \ i.
Proof. If R ∈ F \ i, then every T ∈ F such that T ⊆ R satisfies i /∈ T , and hence
T ∈ F \ i. As a consequence we obtain{
T ∈ F : T ⊆ R ⊆ T+} = {T ∈ F \ i : T ⊆ R ⊆ T+} ,









The Shapley value is a linear mapping with respect to the characteristic function,
and the images of the unanimity games are given by (cf. Owen [12])
Φi (N, uR) =
{
1 /|R| if i ∈ R,
0 otherwise.

















Next we compute the contribution of player i ∈ N to the payoff of player j = i.
Proposition 4.11. For all (N, v,F) ∈ AS and all i, j ∈ N with i = j, the
allocation rule α satisfies
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Proof. Let us consider i ∈ N , j ∈ N \ i, and Fi = {S ∈ F : i ∈ S} . Since
α (N, v,F) = Φ (N, vF) , applying Lemma 4.10 we obtain
Dαij (N, v,F) = Φj
(
N, vF
































since {R ∈ Fi : j ∈ R} = {R ∈ F : i, j ∈ R} implies the last equation.
The following theorem provides a characterization of the value α for augmenting
structures.
Theorem 4.12. The value α is the unique allocation rule on the set of all
augmenting structures AS that satisfies component efficiency, loop-null, and balanced
contributions.
Proof. Propositions 4.4, 4.6, and 4.11 state that the value α satisfies component
effiency, loop-null, and balanced contribution properties. Let us consider an allocation
rule γ on AS which satisfies these three properties. We will prove that γ (N, v,F) =
α (N, v,F) for all (N, v,F) ∈ AS by induction on k = |F| ≥ 1.
If k = 1, then F = {∅}, and hence any player i ∈ N is a loop player. In view of
the loop-null property, γi (N, v,F) = αi (N, v,F) = 0 for all i ∈ N.
Let k > 1 and suppose that γ (N, v,F) = α (N, v,F) for all (N, v,F) ∈ AS such
that |F| ≤ k − 1. We now consider an augmenting structure (N, v,F) with |F| = k.
Since N is the disjoint union of the set of loop players and the components of N, it
suffices to prove that for every M ∈ CF (N) we have γi (N, v,F) = αi (N, v,F) for
all i ∈ M.
If we suppose that |M | = 1, applying component efficiency we obtain the equality.
Then, without loss of generality, we denote M = {1, . . . ,m} ∈ CF (N), where m ≥ 2.
Since γ satisfies balanced contributions, we apply this property to pairs {1, j}, where
j = 2, . . . ,m, and hence we obtain the following system of m equations:
γ2 (N, v,F)− γ1 (N, v,F) = γ2 (N, v,F \ 1)− γ1 (N, v,F \ 2) ,
...
γm (N, v,F)− γ1 (N, v,F) = γm (N, v,F \ 1)− γ1 (N, v,F \m) ,
m∑
i=1
γi (N, v,F) = v (M) ,
where the last equation follows from the component efficiency property. We can
use the induction hypothesis to obtain the following equivalent system of m linear
equations with γi (N, v,F) , i ∈ M , as unknowns:
γ2 (N, v,F)− γ1 (N, v,F) = α2 (N, v,F \ 1)− α1 (N, v,F \ 2) ,
...
γm (N, v,F)− γ1 (N, v,F) = αm (N, v,F \ 1)− α1 (N, v,F \m) ,
m∑
i=1
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The columns of the matrix of this system are linearly independent, and hence the
system has a unique solution. Since the value α satisfies the balanced contribution
and component efficiency properties, the vector (α1 (N, v,F) , . . . , αm (N, v,F)) is a
solution, and thus γi (N, v,F) = αi (N, v,F) for all i ∈ M.
5. Consistency. An allocation rule γ on the set of all games satisfies Hart and
Mas–Colell consistency [8] if, when γ is applied to a reduced game defined according
to γ, it yields the same allocations as the original game. We will analyze this type of
consistency on the set of all augmenting structures AS. Note that α is the Shapley
value of a restricted game. A natural approach would be to reduce both the game
and the restriction system. This approach will be carried out in the remainder of this
section.
Given an augmenting system (N,F) and a coalition R ⊆ N , we define the re-
striction system (R,FR), where FR = {S ∈ F : S ⊆ R}. It is clear that (R,FR)
is an augmenting system for all R ⊆ N. Note also that F∅ = {∅} , FN = F , and
FN\i = F \ i. Furthermore, we define the trace on R by FR = {S ∩R : S ∈ F}. It
is easy to verify that
(
R,FR) is an augmenting system for all R ⊆ N . Note also
that FN\T = {S \ T : S ∈ F}. We will write for simplicity F−T and F−i instead of
FN\T and FN\i. So, the restriction system FR describes the cooperation possibilities
that players in R have without the help of players outside R. On the other hand, the
trace FR = F−(N\R) describes the cooperation possibilities of players in R under the
assumption that the players outside R cooperate.
Let us consider ∅ = T ⊆ N and S ⊆ N \T . Then we define the set of augmenting
players throughout S as
TS = {i ∈ T : there exist ∅ = R ⊆ S and Q ⊆ T with i ∈ Q and R ∪Q ∈ F} .
Definition 5.1. Let γ be an allocation rule on AS, let (N, v,F) ∈ AS, and let
∅ = T ⊆ N. The γ-reduced game (N \ T, v−Tγ ) is given by







S ∪ TS , v,FS∪TS
)
for all S ⊆ N \ T .
Consistency is then defined as follows.
Definition 5.2. An allocation rule γ on AS is consistent if, for every (N, v,F) ∈
AS and every ∅ = T ⊆ N , we have that
γj
(
N \ T, v−Tγ ,F−T
)
= γj (N, v,F) for all j ∈ N \ T.
We also define 1-consistency as consistency for any T such that |T | = 1. In this
case, TS = {i ∈ T : there exists ∅ = R ⊆ S such that R ∪ i ∈ F}. In order to analyze
1-consistency of the allocation rule α, we prove the following lemmas.
Lemma 5.3. Let (N, v,F) ∈ AS and i ∈ N . Then for every S ⊆ N \ i
rS = cS +
|S|
|S|+ 1cS∪i
holds, where cS and rS denote unanimity coefficients of S in games v
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Proof. Let S ⊆ N \ i. Since {i}S = {i} if there exists R ⊆ S such that R∪ i ∈ F ,
and {i}S = ∅ otherwise, we have that
v−iα (S) =
{
v(S ∪ i)− αi (S ∪ i, v,FS∪i) if ∃R ⊆ S with R ∪ i ∈ F ,
v(S) otherwise.








We analyze the following two cases:
(a) If there exists R ⊆ S with R ∪ i ∈ F , then R ∈ F−i and we select the
component T ∗ ∈ CF−i(S) such that R ⊆ T ∗. Moreover, if T ∈ CF−i(S) with T = T ∗,
then R′ ∪ i /∈ F for all R′ ⊆ T , since otherwise (R ∪ i)∩ (R′ ∪ i) = ∅ implies R∪R′ ∈





(S) = v−iα (T
∗) +
∑
{T∈CF−i (S) :T 	=T∗}
v−iα (T )
= v (T ∗ ∪ i)− αi (T ∗ ∪ i, v,FT∗∪i) +
∑





v (T )− αi (T ∗ ∪ i, v,FT∗∪i)
= vF (S ∪ i)− Φi
(
T ∗ ∪ i, vFT∗∪i) ,
where Φi denotes the Shapley value of player i. It follows from formula (1) that
Φi
(







By definition FT∗∪i = {Q ∈ F : Q ⊆ T ∗ ∪ i} and hence vFT∗∪i = vF in 2FT∗∪i . More-
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We will finish our proof of the case (a) by an induction argument. Let us consider




















Let k ≥ 1 and suppose the statement is true for all coalitions of size at most k.






















































(b) If R ∪ i /∈ F , then for all R ⊆ S every T ∈ CF−i(R) satisfies T ∈ F−i and










v (T ) = vF (R)
for every R ⊆ S, and hence
rS = cS = cS +
|S|
|S|+ 1cS∪i,
where the last equation follows from cS∪i = 0.
The following result states that α satisfies 1-consistency.
Lemma 5.4. The allocation rule α satisfies 1-consistency.
Proof. Let (N, v,F) ∈ AS and let i ∈ N . We denote by cS and rS the unanimity
coefficients of S ⊆ N \ i in games vF and (v−iα )F
−i








































































































Copyright © by SIAM. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.
A VALUE FOR GAMES RESTRICTED BY AUGMENTING SYSTEMS 1005




























for all j ∈ N \ i.
Theorem 5.5. The allocation rule α satisfies consistency.
Proof. We will show that for all augmenting structures (N, v,F) and all nonempty
T ⊂ N , the equality αj (N, v,F) = αj
(
N \ T, v−Tα ,F−T
)
holds for all j ∈ N \ T . We
proceed by induction on |T |. By Lemma 5.4 the statement is true for |T | = 1. Let
k ≥ 1 and suppose the statement is true for all T ⊂ N with |T | ≤ k. Now consider
T ⊂ N with |T | = k; we show that it is also true for T ∪ i, where i ∈ N \ T . Suppose
S ⊆ N \ (T ∪ i) and consider the following two cases:





(S) = v−Tα (S ∪ i)− αi
(


























S ∪ i ∪ TS∪i, v,FS∪i∪TS∪i
)
− αi (S ∪ i ∪ T, v,FS∪i∪T )
= v
(


















S ∪ (T ∪ i)S , v,FS∪(T∪i)S
)
= v−(T∪i)α (S).
The first two equalities follow by definition. The third follows by the induction hy-
pothesis and since
(F−T )
S∪i = (FS∪i∪T )
−T . The fourth equality holds since players
in T \ TS∪i do not influence the payoff of player i. By condition (a) there exists
R ⊆ S and Q ⊆ T such that R ∪ Q ∪ i ∈ F , which implies i ∈ (T ∪ i)S . Indeed,
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(b) If R ∪ i /∈ F−T for all R ⊆ S, then
(v−Tα )
−i





















S ∪ (T ∪ i)S , v,FS∪(T∪i)S
)
= v−(T∪i)α (S).
The first two equalities follow by definition. The third equality holds since TS =
(T ∪ i)S , because of condition (b), implies that R ∪ Q ∪ i /∈ F for all R ⊆ S and all
Q ⊆ T . The last equality holds by definition.
Using the result of these two cases, we get
αj (N, v,F) = αj
(












N \ (T ∪ i), v−(T∪i)α ,F−(T∪i)
)
for all j ∈ N \ (T ∪ i), where the first two equalities hold by the induction hypothesis
and 1-consistency, respectively. The third equality holds since
F−(T∪i) = {S \ (T ∪ i) : S ∈ F} = {(S \ T ) \ i : S \ T ∈ F−T} = (F−T )−i .
The last equality follows by the result derived from the two cases. We conclude that
the statement in the theorem is true for all (N, v,F) and all T ⊂ N with |T | =
k + 1.
We will obtain a characterization of the value α by using consistency and the
initial condition for two-person games defined as follows.
Definition 5.6. An allocation rule γ on AS is standard for two-person restricted
games if for all (N, v,F) ∈ AS with N = {i, j} and all k ∈ N it holds that
γk (N, v,F) = vF ({k}) + 1
2
[
vF (N)− vF ({i})− vF ({j})] .
Theorem 5.7. The value α is the unique allocation rule on AS that satisfies
consistency and is the standard property for two-person restricted games.
Proof. By Theorem 5.5 we know that α satisfies consistency. We will first show
that the value α is standard as well. Since the Shapley value is standard, we find that




= vF ({k}) + 1
2
[
vF (N)− vF ({i})− vF ({j})]
for all k ∈ N, and all (N, v,F) ∈ ASN such that N = {i, j}.
For the converse, assume that the allocation rule γ on AS is consistent and stan-
dard. We show first, by using induction on |N |, that γ satisfies component efficiency.
The standard property yields clearly that γ satisfies the component efficiency property
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For |N | = 1, we have to show that
γi ({i} , v,F) = vF ({i}) =
{
0 if F = {∅} ,
v ({i}) if F = {∅, {i}} .
Consider ({i, j} , w,F) ∈ AS, where w ({i}) = w ({i, j}) = v ({i}) , and w ({j}) =
0. Since {j} /∈ F and {i, j} /∈ F , the standard property implies that γj ({i, j} , w,F) =
0 and
γi ({i, j} , w,F) = wF ({i}) + 1
2
[
wF ({i, j})− wF ({i})− wF ({j})]
= vF ({i}) + 1
2
[
vF ({i})− vF ({i})]
= vF ({i}) .
As v = w−jγ and F−j = F we conclude by consistency of γ that
γi ({i} , v,F) = γi ({i, j} , w,F) = vF ({i}) .
Let k ≥ 3 and suppose that γ is component efficient for all (N, v,F) ∈ AS with
|N | ≤ k − 1. Let us consider (N, v,F) ∈ AS with |N | = k. For every component
S ∈ CF (N) we take T = {j} ⊆ S. Since γ satisfies 1-consistency, we have∑
i∈S





N \ T, v−Tγ ,F−T
)
+ γj (N, v,F)
= v−Tγ (S \ T ) + γj (N, v,F)
= v (S)− γj (S, v,FS) + γj (N, v,F)
= v(S).
The first equality follows by 1-consistency. As S \ T ∈ CF−T (N \ T ) the induction
hypothesis implies the second equality. Since TS\T = T = {j}, the third equality
follows by definition and the last by consistency because of




= γj (S, v,FS) ,
where v
−(N\S)
γ = v and FS = FS are a consequence of the maximal feasibility of
S ∈ CF (N). Therefore, we conclude that γ is component efficient.
We will show by induction on n = |N | that γ (N, v,F) = α (N, v,F) for all
(N, v,F) ∈ AS. This relation has already been shown for n = 1, whereas for n = 2
the equality follows from the standard property for two-person restricted games. Let
n ≥ 3 and assume that the two allocation rules coincide for all augmenting structures
with fewer than n players. For every loop player j ∈ N \ ⋃S∈CF (N) S we have by
consistency
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where the third equality follows by the induction hypothesis and the fourth equality
holds by Proposition 4.6.
It remains to consider players that belong to a component. Consider U ∈ CF (N).
If |U | = 1, the result holds by component efficiency, so we can only study the cases
in which |U | > 1. Let T = {i, j} ⊆ U with i = j. Then for every S ⊆ T such that
|S| = 1, the induction hypothesis implies
v−(N\T )γ (S) = v
(


















S ∪ (N \ T )S, v,FS∪(N\T )S
)













. Since γ and α satisfy consis-
tency and the standard property for two-person restricted games, we have
γk (N, v,F) = γk
(
T, v−(N\T )γ ,FT
)
= wγ ({k}) + 1
2
[wγ (T )− wγ ({i})− wγ ({j})] ,
and also
αk (N, v,F) = αk
(
T, v−(N\T )α ,FT
)
= wα ({k}) + 1
2
[wα (T )− wα ({i})− wα ({j})]
for every k ∈ {i, j} = T . Therefore, using equality (2),
γi (N, v,F)− αi (N, v,F) = 1
2
[wγ (T )− wα (T )] = γj (N, v,F)− αj (N, v,F)
for all i, j ∈ T . Thus, the above equality is true for any two players i, j ∈ U . Com-
bining this with component efficiency of γ and α yields∑
i∈U
[γi (N, v,F)− αi (N, v,F)] = v (U)− v (U) = 0,
which implies γi (N, v,F) = αi (N, v,F) for all i ∈ U .
6. Computing directly the value α. Finally, since we have studied two dif-
ferent approaches to characterize the value α from a theoretical point of view, we
think that it might be interesting to give an algorithm written using Mathematica
code to compute it directly and whose computational complexity is polynomial in
the cardinality of the feasible coalitions. Notice that one of the main problems is to
compute this value when the number of players is large. To provide this algorithm we
based it on an explicit formula given by Bilbao [2].
Let (N, v,F) be an augmenting structure. The value α (N, v,F) is given by
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where i ∈ N , n = |N |, and s = |S|. This value is an average of the marginal
contributions vF (S)− vF (S \ i) of a player i to all coalitions S ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
If the number of players is n, then the function that measures the worst-case
running time for computing this index is in O (n2n). Moreover, to obtain the restricted
game vF we need to compute the set of the components CF(S) of every subset S ⊆ N .
Then it is necessary to consider all the feasible subsets of S, and hence the time









As a consequence of Proposition 4.9, Bilbao [2] obtains the following explicit
formula, in terms of v, for the Shapley value of the players in the restricted game vF .
The time complexity of the formula is polynomial in the cardinality |F|.
Theorem 6.1. Let (N, v,F) be an augmenting structure. Then








t! (t∗ − 1)!
t+!
v(T ),
where i ∈ N, t = |T |, t∗ = |T ∗|, and t+ = |T+|.
The following algorithm obtained from Theorem 6.1, and written using Mathe-












co1[#] (v[#])]& /@ Feasible[i,F]]-
Apply[Plus,If[#=={},0,co2[#] v[#]]& /@ Augmentation[i,F]],
{i,Length[T]}];Return[value]];
REFERENCES
[1] E. Algaba, J. M. Bilbao, R. van den Brink, and A. Jiménez-Losada, Cooperative games
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